Tuesday, April 6, 2010

Questioning Kant's Good, and the Means to this Good

I managed to get an interview with Immanuel Kant this week. Kant telephoned me from his bunk bed in heaven. Many thanks to the angels who contributed countless hours to translate Kant’s dialogue from his own private language.

Thomas Hamed: So can you sum up your political philosophy in three sentences?
Immanuel Kant: No

TH: Can I?
IK: Probably not without making false assumptions of my statements.

TH: Well, based on my reading of Perpetual Peace and Theory and Practice, I have come up with three statements:

1. Man uses morality to transcend his animalistic nature, and gains greater moral insight as time goes on.
2. A good government is one where the people’s morality aligns with the rulers’, and all understand and execute their duties.
3. Nations should federate to foster peace and understanding between each other, especially when those nations meet conditions in #2.

Am I right?

IK: You are (woefully) incomplete, inbreeding my philosophy with your own views by removing key qualifications I make throughout my work. Have you read my Critique of Pure Reason, Critique on Practical Reason, and the other thousands of pages I have penned? They give you a much fuller account of how I expect man to transcend his brutish nature, and how he must achieve it.

TH: I am sure they are enlightening. I want to ask you a few questions about the premises of your first statement.
IK: If you wish.

TH: From what I have read, you describe well how man can transcend, and why he may wish to transcend himself. Yet the very word “transcend” implies he is going somewhere he knows little about, possibly even this state’s existence. Comment on that.
IK: Man may not know consciously, but does know through his limited perception of time.

TH: Let’s accept that notion of time [it will take a semester to discuss this]. What’s the good man is moving towards?
IK: Harmony, for one thing. Moral harmony, to be precise. Peace is also a goal, as the more peace one has, the happier he is.

TH: And so you regard peace as a good in itself?
IK: Yes.

TH: Is peace “good” enough that it requires moral concord within a state?
IK: Undoubtedly.

Here, the translators quit work. I am a skeptic of Kant’s philosophy, as it assumes there is an objective “good”, and that the methods towards this good are just. I feel that Kant’s philosophy paints humanity with a broad brush stroke, and may loose the very diversity he defends in Perpetual Peace. Furthermore, I find disturbing his defense of individual duty towards a state. While duty is necessary for the orderly workings of a state, I remain unconvinced that it fosters a state’s moral advancement.

Thursday, April 1, 2010

Society and the Indivdual justice

One argument of his that I find interesting is that in justice, even if a few cases do not seem to be the most fair thing (do to extenuating circumstances, etc.), that in no way implies that it is not the right to follow the same lines of justice. While he does still often hold he individual as a basic unit, this is particularly society oriented, as Hume believes that without the maintenance of the same rules of justice even in cases where they don't seem to fit is essential to the maintenance of order and society. And although Hume's belief in a "state of nature" is purely as a theoretical background, he believes that any society would be better than none. He thus brings the individual priority back in in the English tradition.

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Civilization: Run Away?

Is civilization at the root of inequality? That’s what Jean-Jacque Rousseau would have us believe. To Rousseau, a state of nature was not just a society without a government, but a time when humans were true animals. Rousseau acknowledges that physical differences exist, but not differences based on anything else. As he says on page 38, that can only come with civilization, or as he says, when, “...nature was subjected to the law.” Notice the use of passive voice in this statement, emphasizing nature over mankind.
So why does civilization breed indifference? The answer is simple: it’s the belief in property. In Rousseau’s mind, man was once simply a beast, prancing around the forest while foraging for food. A bear or a wolf may eat one for lunch one day, but a quick runner could avoid this. All of this changed when man obtained property, and forced himself to settle down.
In my mind, Rousseau’s philosophy of civilization and sedation the relates somewhat to the movie Up in the Air. In the movie, the protagonist travels 320 days a year for his job, and has no real home nor family. While on the road, he gives motivational speeches that tell people to sever their family connections and material possessions. Toward the end of the movie, the protagonist’s sister asks him what kind of f----- up philosophy he’s preaching. The two philosophers attack two different things (Rousseau attacks society, Clooney’s character attacks human interaction), but I feel their methodologies are the same: push civilization away and run from your problems.

State of Nature and further Reflections

In my reading, his description of the state of nature and the possible transition therefrom was very informative of his ideas on government and society. Although the entire idea of society as a social construct itself struck me as interesting as this becomes a similar chicken and egg problem to what he points out as his conception of how language and society grew. As an answer to that question of his, I answer with the following: likely the two grew together. A basic means of communication, even if it did not originally rise to the level of a language, existed for chance encounters, and even presuming the family unit stayed practically non-existent, mothers would pass on what language they had discovered growing up to their children (in addition to any technical innovations, which Rousseau also claims must originally must disappear each generation). Since unlike in the chicken and egg question, community and language can form simultaneously, that is what likely occurred, each allowing (and demanding) more complexities than the other. In the totality, while I do not agree with the extreme solitariness of humans before society (he gives no reason why humans wouldn't be in groups like many animals), nor of there complete incomprehension of the future (storing food for winter would require some level of forethought), his conception of people seems more realistic than Hobbs'.

However, combining the two pieces, I still see that the ideal place for man to be is in small societies of towns that can expect no interference from other groups. He acknowledges that true happiness can also be found when around family, which although he does not directly say so, he implies can be greater than the not quite idyllic peace and freedom from obligations found by man alone.


Going through the texts again also gave me further thought into who he would truly consider a citizen and part of the general will. While he does not address the role of children as part of this either way, he does make several implications throughout as to the role of women. Their role is clearly stated to be less than that of men in other spheres, and he clearly thinks that there value is less, and makes only a slight mention of the Roman's non-inclusion of women in there system, which is much less than he talks about the non-inclusion of slaves and non-citizens. Therefore there is an inconsistency in his reasoning in regard to women. They can either be a full part of the general will and an equal part of the sovereign, or they can be hold a lesser place in society. To try to place them in both categories seems paradoxical to me. I also cannot recall any point in which he describes if any portion of the population should not be accounted for in the general will, accept those who are traitors. And yet he did not seem deeply troubled that some of the governments of the past that he held in higher esteem were highly exclusive.

Thursday, March 18, 2010

No Civil Society?

One thing that struck me was the end of Chapter III in Book II when Rousseau asserts that there "should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind" (156). While this would be a good thing, and may to some extent have been more possible at his time, the lack of civil society now would hinder peoples abilities to have the information to make up his own mind. Since most issues and topics in general are very involved and without groups who care specifically about the information gathering it and distributing it, it would become difficult to know enough about an issue to make up your own mind. While he would likely be more against societies such as unions and fixed political parties, civil society would also fall under his assertions against partitions in society since it is methods of bringing people interested in specific issues to work on and discuss issues which relate to their community, and often spread information and opinions about those topics.
Now, civil society is considered an important part of building a society into a democracy and involve people actively in having a voice and being able to analyze for themselves what their opinions should be on government. So why does Rousseau think that this segment is more harmful? For other issues he carefully weighs the positives and negatives, but not here. Is the objection based mainly on that subgroups within the society will inherently weaken the greater whole? If so, how does he feel that everyone should have the knowledge to evaluate their stances?

Rousseau: It's Whom You Know

“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains?” Really? What kinds of chains? To me, Rousseau outlines two general kinds of chains: those from society (learning, culture, etc.) and self-imposed chains (social compact, etc.). The second form of chain interests me, because the chain (relationships) form the heart of Rousseau’s government, and aren’t necessarily bad.

Rousseau’s state is one of reciprocal relationships. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, who advocates passive acceptance of a sovereign, Rousseau advocates active participation in state life. Rousseau sees this participation as a reduction in liberty, but this is not bad in itself. Instead, it moves closer to what Rousseau respects as the legitimate sovereign of his state: the general will.

One thing that puzzled me was Rousseau’s assumption that freedom bred civic virtue. In a way, the link is obvious, as freedom is for the individual to delegate, and he may delegate it to his neighbors in a compact. But are all free men virtuous people whom love their neighbors? What is there’s a Hobbesian jerk who uses freedom (or state of nature) to kill his neighbors and take their goods? Rousseau dismisses Hobbesian psychology altogether, but does he really believe that his own psychology prevails among everyone?

Thursday, March 4, 2010

Freedom and Tyranny

While I did not have the opportunity to enter into a discussion with Locke himself, I instead focused on finding points in the text which seemed rather self evident now, but wouldn't have been. First was the concept of freedom he presented, specifically that if someone hindered ones freedom in any way, they would by necessity be be planning on taking everything else to. It struck me as opposing previous views, and prevailing logic at the time that slaves could and should be content with their lot as it was where they belonged, and not be in "a state of war continued" against their master. He does say that a contract between the two would nullify the slavery aspect and turn it into drudgery. The question is then, would the slave no longer be considered a slave by Locke if (s)he did anything that the master asked that didn't directly let them live longer? How implicit or explicit would the contract have to be according to Locke?

Significant is that Locke uses many words and phrases in the same manner we would now use them commonly, and different from how they have been in the past. Specifically tyrant, for example, which he lays out is a ruler(s) who is not governed by the laws of the land and steps beyond the role given to him by the public. It will be interesting to see if this way of viewing tyranny continues to change in the literature or that it has remained relatively fixed since this time period. At this point I feel its more likely that this is the definition we use because of how often Locke was cited in the beginning of our country's history, and not because his definition became prevailing throughout future literature.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Where Do Property Rights Really Come From?

I am trying a little something different this week. While I’d like to blabber on what I’ve just read, I realize that no one really wants to read it. So I decided to go out and interview John Locke. There was no gurantee he was listening to my prayers that day, but he gave me a ring and granted my own phone interview. Think Glubdubdrib, only real.

What follows is a relevant excerpt from my interview.


John Locke: My wife’s harp playing has gotten a lot better. You know, they finally gave her a different cloud than my own.


Thomas Hamed (rolls eyes): Really?

JL: Yeah. Now I can have her other angel friends come over.


TH: That’s awesome! Listen, I wanted to ask you a few questions about your philosophy.

JL: Go for it.


TH: You see, I read The Second Treatise, and have to say I agree with your conclusions.

JL: How so?


TH: I agree with your conclusions. I agree that man has an inherent right to property, and that he should form civil society with other men to protect those property rights.

JL: Yes.

TH: You said the right to property comes from man’s industry. Elaborate on that.


JL: Yes, well, you hit the nail right on the head. Let’s say you are a native in America.


TH: Doesn’t work these days. They’re gone

JL: Okay, let’s say you are a native deep in the Amazon, where no one has reached you. You live off nature’s bounty, for she provides you with everything. Alack, you need not improve the land. You do not inherently own it, but you don’t need to. You are in a state of nature, and being that things are not as dense, you can live off nature’s bounty and never be in conflict with your neighbors. There’s no need to assign property, nor to mitigate disputes.


TH: Sounds logical. Tell me, why does right necessarily flow from industry?

JL: Because, well, it seems functional to me. Take my example of the water in the pitcher. Surely, the water in a fountain is common, but that’s only because it doesn’t do much. It’s just a bunch of molecules sitting there. In the pitcher, the man has intention to drink it. A similar concept applies to my wife’s lady friends.

TH: But you say that the right of property is natural? Why?

JL (long pause): You preposterous mongrel! You rogue! Why do you think it’s a law of nature? Didn’t God give you the will to survive? Natural law is based on what you do in a state of nature, and what God has given you.

TH: But let’s just say I had no intention of survival. Let’s just say I left the water in the fountain not out of altruism, but because I had no real will to survive. It’d strip me of any pretense to need the water to live. Then what? Do I still have an inherent right to the water?

JL: If you take it, yes. You grabbed it with your own resources, and are therefore entitled to it.

TH: That doesn’t tell me where the right came from. What if you come along and drink the water from my pitcher without asking? That’s wrong to you, but why is it wrong? What dictates how it is right and how it is wrong?

Locke said something or another, and then hung up. So I am confused. He’s too wedded to his own ideas to help me understand. Where does he derive his rights from? The Bible? It’s a great source, but let’s just say my god didn’t leave behind a sacred text. Then what?

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Dear Hobbes: Why Should Self-Interested Actors Want a Dictator?

Whenever I read a philosophy text, the first question I ask myself is why I am reading this. With Leviathan, the question was more of “why the f@%k am I reading this $h!t?” Hobbes babbles, he drones, and he generally sounds grumpy. Very grumpy. Had he written Leviathan today, his children would take him to a place where someone could help take care of him. This conclusion assumes he has children in the first place, and thus a wife who loves him for who he is. Is that possible?

But let’s just assume he isn’t a senile meanie, and that humans really are the way Hobbes says they are. Is his dictatorial state the only answer to society’s problems? To this, I offer two observations. First, Hobbes’s humans are too self-interested to peacefully govern as a democracy. As Hobbes sees it, law exists only because the sovereign says it exists. In a government where actors share sovereignty, law becomes individualistic to each member, and the concept of justice less universal. “Where there is no common power,” Hobbes writes, “there is no law; where no law, no injustice (xiii, 13).

Secondly, Hobbes probably used the English Civil War as a model for humanity. Hobbes lived through this war, and wrote Leviathan from exile in Paris. While Hobbes only makes a few passing references to the war, I feel we must keep the historical perspectives in the back of our minds.

What Hobbes does not clarify is why anyone would accept the rule of the sovereign. Hobbes makes clear that the subjects must accept the sovereign’s authority, or else the state will not function well. Hobbes also makes clear that humans will seek a strong state to maintain peace, and thus avoid their fear of death. What Hobbes does not make clear is how a desire for peace overrides a drive for self-interest the subjects may have.

Suppose, for instance, that I am the sovereign of a state with a few million people. I go to war with my neighboring states, mismanage my finances, and plunge my subjects into poverty. Then what? I am still able to maintain internal piece, and my subjects accept my ability to do so. However, I am not maximizing their welfare. Even though they don’t have the right to overthrow me, wouldn’t they be better off killing me and getting someone else? I am not sure Hobbes addresses this.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Is Descartes's Epistemology a bit circular?

First of all, everything I will say next sounds really stupid when I repeat it to myself. Our class discusses what we know and what we don’t know, but does that really matter? When I stand in the middle of a street, and a bus barrels towards me, should I debate its existence? Should I move?
As stupid as Descartes’s philosophy sound, it does establish an intellectual framework I suspect Did Descartes change philosophy? Well, I don’t know enough to say if he did or if he didn’t. What I do believe is that Descartes approaches problems logically: he knows for sure only what he can see in his mind. According to Descartes, he exists because he is sentient and autonomous, and that he is unsure of the existence of anything outside his mind.
I do not question his sense of reality, for it aligns closely with my own. What I do question is his epistemology, especially in fields he feels are obvious to him. For instance, Descartes holds that mathematics is true whether it exists in reality or not. But if mathematics do not exist in actuality, how do its laws work inside his mind?
Descartes’s answer is that there’s something inherent in mathematics that makes it right. How does he know that? He imagines the laws to be so. But what mechanisms inside his mind make this true? Descartes cannot tell us because his philosophy allows him to reference nothing outside his mind, save for what he trusts. If he cannot reference anything outside of his mind, how can he truly know anything?
That’s my primary question with Descartes’s inward-looking philosophy. I have other questions, such as one concerning his proof of God’s existence. However, the above question stands out in my mind, and hopefully, we can have a class to discuss this in.